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The U.S. is currently engulfed in the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression. A key
structural factor behind this crisis is the large demand for riskless assets from the rest of the world.
In this paper we present a model to show how such demand not only triggered a sharp rise in U.S.
asset prices, but also exposed the U.S. financial sector to a downturn by concentrating risk onto its
balance sheet. In addition to highlighting the role of capital flows in facilitating the securitization boom,
our analysis speaks to the broader issue of global imbalances. While in emerging markets the concern
with capital flows is in their speculative nature, in the U.S. the risk in capital inflows derives from
the opposite concern: capital flows into the U.S. are mostly non-speculative and in search of safety.
As a result, the U.S. sells riskless assets to foreigners, and in so doing, it raises the effective leverage
of its financial institutions. In other words, as global imbalances rise, the U.S. increasingly specializes














a-krishnamurthy@northwestern.eduThe U.S. is currently engulfed in the most severe ﬁnancial crisis since the Great Depres-
sion. The crisis was triggered by the crash in the real estate “bubble” and ampliﬁed by the
extreme concentration of risk in a highly leveraged ﬁnancial sector.
Conventional wisdom is that both the bubble and the risk concentration were the result
of mistakes in regulatory policy: an expansionary monetary policy during the boom period
of the bubble, and failure to reign in the practices of unscrupulous lenders. In this paper
we argue that, while correct in some dimensions, this story misses two key structural factors
behind the securitization process that supported the real estate boom and the corresponding
leverage: First, over the last decade, the U.S. has experienced large and sustained capital
inﬂows from foreigners seeking U.S. assets to store value (Ricardo J. Caballero et al 2008).
Second, especially after the NASDAQ/Tech bubble and bust, excess world savings have
looked predominantly for safe debt investments. This should not be surprising because
a large amount of the capital ﬂow into the U.S. has been from foreign central banks and
governments who are not expert investors and are merely looking for a store of value (Arvind
Krishnamurthy and Annette Vissing-Jorgenson, 2008).
In this paper we develop a stylized model that captures the essence of this environment.
The model accounts for three facts observed during the boom and bust phases of the current
crisis: First, during a period of good shocks –which we interpret as the period up to the
end of 2006– the growth in asset demand pushes up asset prices and lowers risk premia
and interest rates. It is interesting to observe that the value of risky assets rises despite
the fact that the increase in demand is for riskless assets. Second, foreign demand for debt
instruments increases the equilibrium level of leverage of the domestic ﬁnancial sector. In
order to accommodate this demand, the U.S. ﬁnancial sector manufactures debt claims out
of all types of products, which is the reason for the wave of securitization. Third, if shocks
turn negative –which we interpret as the period post-2006 – the foreign demand now turns
toxic; bad shocks and high leverage lead to an ampliﬁed downturn and rising risk premia.
2In addition to highlighting the role of capital ﬂows in facilitating the securitization boom,
our analysis also speaks to the broader issue of global imbalances. Many of the concerns
regarding global imbalances derive from emerging markets’ experiences, where capital ﬂows
are often speculative and a source of volatility, as emphasized in the literature on sudden
stops. Our analysis shows that somewhat paradoxically, for a core economy such as the
U.S., the risk in “excessive” capital inﬂows derives from the opposite concern: capital ﬂows
into the U.S. are mostly non-speculative and in search of safety. As a result, the U.S. sells
riskless assets to foreigners and in so doing it raises the eﬀective leverage of its ﬁnancial
institutions. In other words, as global imbalances rise, the U.S. increasingly specializes in
holding its “toxic waste.”
I Foreign Flows and Fragility
Time is continuous and indexed by t. There is a continuum of U.S. ﬁnancial institutions,
with mass one, that own assets which generate cash ﬂows of Xd





= gdt + σdZt,
for constants g and σ. We can think of these cash-ﬂows as arising from mortgage loans,
credit card loans, auto loans, etc. We assume the cash-ﬂow process is exogenously given
and not aﬀected by other developments in the economy. This is certainly counterfactual,
but simpliﬁes the analysis of asset market equilibrium. In practice, some of these cash ﬂows
were brought onto banks’ balance sheets as a response to the massive demand for assets.
Our analysis starts from a moment where these cash-ﬂows already exist, but it may also be
interesting to model this process as a response to high asset demand. We denote the present
value of the cash-ﬂows Xd
t held by the ﬁnancial institutions as Vt.
The ﬁnancial institutions have two liabilities, equity and short-term (instantaneous) debt.
We assume there are no bankruptcy costs. This implies, since our model is set in continuous
3time (and sample paths), that the short-term debt is risk-free.
Our key assumption concerns the demand for the safe debt. The external demand for
U.S. assets, from foreign central banks for example, is in particular a demand for high-grade
debt. We capture this demand in a reduced form fashion. We assume that there is a measure
one of foreign investors who only invest in the debt of ﬁnancial institutions. They allocate







= gdt + (1 − ψ)σdZt,
to investments in U.S. assets. The stream X
f
t is perfectly correlated with U.S. income but
for most our analysis we assume that it is less volatile than domestic income. Hence ψ > 0
and, by themselves, capital ﬂows are a source of income stability. We may also think of the
case of ψ < 0 as that corresponding to emerging markets, where capital ﬂows exacerbate the
cycle.
Foreigners’ bond holdings are denoted by B
f
t . We also assume that the foreign investors













t )dt + rtB
f
t dt.
Throughout our analysis we will imagine that there is a date, t0, on which the foreign
1Suppose foreigners are modeled as overlapping generations. They live from t to t+δ (δ → dt). The pre-
vious generation bequests B
f
t of wealth. Then the current generation receives Xtdt of income and consumes
ct to solve:
max ρδln ct + (1 − ρδ)Et[ln B
f
t+δ]
Note that the utility for bequest is over wealth. If we take δ → dt, this model yields the assumed consumption
behavior of foreign investors.
4investors’ demand for U.S. debt ﬁrst arises. We refer to this as the date of foreign entry. We
analyze how this entry aﬀects the equilibrium.









The value of their ownership stake in the ﬁnancial institutions, or the equity value of ﬁnancial
institutions, is
Wt = Vt − B
f
t .
A simple argument deriving from log preference allows us to derive the equity value.
The local investor has wealth Wt and given log preference, he consumes ρWt. The following










On the left-side is the amount of cash generated by the ﬁnancial institution plus the amount
of foreign savings investedin the U.S.. Thus it is the total amount of cash inﬂow into ﬁnancial
institutions. On the right-side is the amount consumed by local investors plus the amount
of cash repatriated by foreign investors (i.e. cash outﬂows). This condition is basically a




























These expressions lead to the ﬁrst result of the analysis.
Proposition 1 (Asset Demand Eﬀect)
An increase in foreign demand for riskless assets, X
f
t , raises the value of risky domestic
assets, Vt, and of domestic ﬁnancial wealth, Wt. An increase in foreign riskless debt B
f
t ,
lowers the value of domestic ﬁnancial wealth.
Consider an initial condition when China begins to invest in U.S. debt so that X
f
t turns
positive. Our proposition shows that this ﬂow will push up the value of U.S. assets and
domestic ﬁnancial wealth in the short run. It explains how the value of U.S. assets rose
in the early stages of external demand. This is the asset demand eﬀect highlighted in the
riskless environment of Caballero et al (2008).
We next solve for the interest rate, rt. Investors can purchase either equity or debt from
ﬁnancial institutions. Thus the interest rate must satisfy the local investor’s marginal pricing
condition (Euler equation). Going through the usual asset pricing steps based on an investor
with consumption ct, we have,
rt = ρ + Et[dct/ct] − V art[dct/ct].
The local investor has log preferences and wealth Wt. Thus,
ct = ρWt.
We can then compute Et[dWt/Wt] and V art[dWt/Wt] to ﬁnd the equilibrium interest rate.





























Proposition 2 (Interest Rate) The interest rate is
rt =
￿




















The ﬁrst term in parenthesis corresponds to the interest rate in the absence of foreign
capital ﬂows. The next two terms capture opposing eﬀects that foreign entry has on the
interest rate. The ﬁrst eﬀect comes from expanding Et[dWt/Wt]. Upon entry, asset demand
rises and lowers interest rates (mechanically, from the Euler equation, local wealth jumps on
entry and thereafter grows more slowly, which requires a lower interest rate). The second
eﬀect is from the precautionary savings term V art[dWt/Wt]. When ψ > 0, external ﬂows
reduce domestic volatility because these ﬂows are more stable than local cash-ﬂows. This



















This expression is positive since x
f
t < 1 and ψ > 0.
Whether interest rates rise or fall upon foreign entry at t0 depends upon parameters.
However, as time passes, the precautionary savings eﬀect puts downward pressure on interest
rates. To see this, note that over time, as foreign debt accumulates, risk is brought back via
an increase in leverage, b
f
t . Since foreign debt holders must be promised a ﬁxed repayment,
the domestic equity holders hold a residual claim that becomes riskier as leverage rises. The
7corresponding rise in precautionary savings reduces interest rates.
The interest rate expression also reveals a contrast between the emerging markets case
and the U.S. case. As we have noted, we may think of the emerging markets case as one
where foreign inﬂows are strongly procyclical, so that ψ < 0. In this case, foreign demand
raises local volatility and risk, lowering interest rates through this precautionary savings
eﬀect.
Foreign entry, although creating some ambiguity in signing the change in interest rates,
has a clear eﬀect on risk premia. Let us consider a hypothetical asset-i, whose return depends







Thus, if we think of dZt as reﬂecting risk on mortgage loans held by ﬁnancial institutions,
this asset can be thought of as a mortgage-backed security. In general, the asset’s return is
correlated with the risks held by ﬁnancial institutions.
Suppose that this asset is in zero net supply, then let us consider how Et[dRi
t] will be
determined. At the margin, if one of the ﬁnancial institutions purchases this asset, it is
taking on more risk, which then aﬀects the risk held by the local investors. Thus, the
expected return has to compensate the local investors for bearing additional risk. Since the
local investors have wealth of Wt, we have,
Et[dR
i












Proposition 3 (Risk Premium)
If ψ > 0, an increase in foreign demand for riskless assets, x
f
t, lowers the risk premium
on domestic assets. An increase in foreign leverage, b
f
t, always raises the risk premium.
8The intuition here is similar to that oﬀered for the precautionary savings eﬀects. Since
ψ > 0, foreign inﬂows are more stable than domestic cash-ﬂows, and hence the stabilization
eﬀect lowers risk premia.2 This is the immediate eﬀect of foreign ﬂows on domestic risk
premia. This eﬀect helps explain why the U.S. experienced a sustained period of low risk
premia beginning in 2000.3
Over time, external leverage grows and transfers more residual risk onto the domestic
equity holders. This eﬀect increases risk premia and as time passes becomes the dominant
driver of the risk premium. Moreover, leverage also leads to a dynamic ampliﬁcation mecha-
nism. If U.S. shocks turn negative so that Xd
t and Vt fall, the eﬀective leverage, b
f
t = Bt/Vt,
rises. Thus the negative shock, through leverage, leads risk premia to rise further. We
interpret the magniﬁed downturn beginning in mid-2007 as corresponding to this leverage
multiplier eﬀect.





























Figure 1: Model Simulation
Notes: Risk premium and interest rate (left panel) and asset value and external debt (right panel) are graphed over
time. Parameters are g = 0.03,σ = 0.20,ρ = 0.04 and ψ = 0.5. We set Xf(t0) = 0.5Xd(t0). We also use an initial
condition for debt upon entry at t0 such that B(t0) = V (t0)/5, which helps to pictorially see the results. Time 0 is
the date of foreign entry. Time 6 is the date when shocks turn negative. Prior to Time 6, Xf and Xd grow at rate
g, while after Time 6 they grow at rates g − 2σ and g − σ, respectively.
2There is another channel through which risk premia may fall. Since foreign inﬂows raise domestic wealth,
through decreasing absolute risk aversion there is a wealth eﬀect that will lower risk premia.
3Note that if ψ < 0, foreign inﬂows raises local risk premia. In this sense, the case of emerging markets
experience with capital inﬂows is one of unambiguously rising risk.
9Figure 1 illustrates these results. We set g = 0.03,σ = 0.20,ρ = 0.04,ψ = 0.5, and set
Xf(t0) = 0.5Xd(t0). We also use an initial condition for debt upon entry at t0 such that
B(t0) = V (t0)/5, which helps to pictorially see the results. Time 0 is the date of foreign
entry. We plot a particular realization of shocks such that prior to Time 6, Xf and Xd grow
at rate g, while after Time 6 they grow at rates g − 2σ and g − σ, respectively. Thus we
interpret Time 6 as the date when shocks turn negative.
The left panel of the ﬁgure shows that the risk premium and interest rate fall upon entry.
The risk premium rises thereafter as leverage accumulates, rising faster after Time 6. The
interest rate uniformly falls as risk accumulates over time. The right panel of the ﬁgure
shows that the asset value rises upon entry before falling when shocks turn negative.
II Securitization and Misperceived Safety
How is safe debt created and sold to satisfy debt demand? The model represents safe-debt
as a short-term claim on the ﬁnancial institutions. Thus the model directly can account for
the increase in ﬁnancial sector leverage ratios in the period preceding the crisis. In practice,
debt is also created through the process of securitization: pooling and tranching of mortgage
and related assets to form “Aaa” senior tranches; the ﬁnancial sector writing credit default
insurance on risky loans, which is then packaged with the risky loans to form safe debt. The
process of safe-debt creation is evident in much of the ﬁnancial innovation during the last
seven years.
The events of the summer of 2007 revealed that some of the safe debt created by ﬁnancial
innovations was not truly safe. The assumptions on cash-ﬂow correlations underlying the
insurance beneﬁts to the pooling aspect of securitization proved wrong. As a result, senior
tranches had higher default exposure than had been perceived by many investors. The
institutions that sold credit default insurance ran into trouble, calling into question the
value of the credit default insurance they had sold to support the safe status of some debts.
10In short, safe-debt has proven to be unsafe.
The realization of misperceived safety can create a further leverage ampliﬁer. Prior to
the investors’ realization, some investors were holding claims which they thought were safe-
debt but were in fact closer to equity. When investors realized this fact they shifted their
portfolios to sell the “equity” and demand safe-debt.
It is straightforward to see the eﬀect of such a portfolio shift: interest rates fall, the risk
premium rises, and leverage rises, further exposing the ﬁnancial sector to negative shocks.
This realization of misperceptions eﬀect is consistent with a “ﬂight to quality.”
III Conclusion
We have presented a model to show how global imbalances has driven the U.S. securitization
boom and bust. Since ﬂows into the U.S. have been predominantly seeking safe debt, U.S.
ﬁnancial institutions, in producing the safe debt have been left holding a levered claim on
local mortgage risks. Thus our analysis ties together the behavior of leverage and the demand
for U.S. assets. An important aspect of the story that our analysis only touches upon is that
in creating safe assets, the U.S. ﬁnancial sector not only took on more leverage but also
sourced assets (i.e. subprime loans) that carried higher cash-ﬂow risks. That is, part of
the response to the increase in asset demand was an increase in asset supply, which at the
margin may have led to more toxic assets being created. It is likely that this phenomenon,
also driven by external demand for U.S. assets, has played a part in the build-up to the
current ﬁnancial crisis.
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